An Open Letter to The Intelligence Community

No More Politicized Intelligence

As a nearly 40-year veteran of our intelligence community (IC) – both in and out of uniform – I

am writing to implore the professionals (the leaders and the workers) of our great IC to return to

our roots of providing the best fact-based assessments to our national leadership. I fear, as borne

out with public evidence, that we have slipped into a world of allowing bias and politicization to

seep into our assessments, thus taking us from being “providers” of intelligence to those

“attempting to influence” the outcome in whatever perspective we believe is best at the time.

As we move forward after the critical leadership transition between the Biden and Trump

Administrations, I feel now is the time to remind us all of our duty to provide intelligence to our

leadership that gives them decision-advantage intelligence to protect our national interests as

articulated via our National Security and National Defense Strategies.

My concern that we are slipping from our mission and duty of a pure fact-based intelligence role

to one of manipulating that intelligence to what we believe is best, stems from articles published

in 2024 in Politico (“The Prospect of a Second Trump Presidency Has The Intelligence

Community on Edge”; Politico, 26 Feb 2024) and The Wall Street Journal (“Intelligence

Officials View A New Trump Term Warily”; WSJ, 9 Sep 2024). Both articles cited “concern”

from several current and former intelligence officials about how a President Trump could be

biased against the IC and its analysis if it does not fit his policy objectives and that he may try to

overhaul the IC.

LEADERS DON’T HAVE TO LISTEN (And Some Didn’t):

Let me be direct. To all of them, I say, so what? That is the President’s prerogative. Our leaders

are under no obligation – regardless of their reason – to listen or agree with what assessments we

make. I can point out multiple examples of leaders who did not make a decision based on what

we assessed would or would not be the outcome.

For instance, George H.W. Bush did not prioritize a crumbling Yugoslavia, and the challenges

that presented, choosing to focus on Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the resulting U.S.

military Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

President Bill Clinton inherited the Yugoslavia situation, in which a failing country was at risk of

political implosion, and chose to ignore intelligence warnings until the ethnic cleansing in that

country became too public to ignore, at which point he began a U.S.-led NATO air campaign to

stop the fighting. Clinton also ignored several intelligence warnings about al-Qaida, even after its

deadly attacks on two U.S. embassies in 1998, and in 2000 on the USS Cole, a U.S. Navy

destroyer. He chose more limited responses than aides suggested, including passing up an

opportunity to kill al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden.

President Barack Obama chose to dismiss indications relayed by intelligence officials that Russia

was going to invade Ukraine in 2014 – which it did. He focused on the Middle East instead.

Obama’s goal of withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq led him to discount warnings of the potential

threat from what would become the Islamic State group – which in 2014 took advantage of the

American departure to launch a major assault and seize a massive amount of territory in both

Syria and Iraq. Driving the group out required significant reengagement from the U.S. military.

And President Joe Biden ignored military and intelligence assessments that the Afghan military

and government were weak and would not be able to withstand Taliban attacks if the U.S.

military withdrew. And until almost the last moment, the Biden administration did not believe

warnings that Russia was about to launch a second invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In both cases,

the intelligence predictions were correct.

INTELLIGENCE DOESN’T MAKE POLICY:

We in intelligence do not have a crystal ball and do not get everything 100% correct – that is an

impossibility in this line of work. But when we do, our leaders are under no obligation to listen –

as the above listing illustrates is not a new or isolated occurrence.

Our elected leaders, their appointees and other policy makers are charged with making policy –

both domestic, international and those about our national security. Our intelligence professionals

are not. Our job in intelligence is to provide policy makers with the best possible intelligence

assessment about situations and our adversaries and what might or might not be the result of

those decisions – based solely on the facts of the situation.

I served my almost-40 years and worked under both political parties. I thought some decisions

those leaders made were great and some terrible – (NOTE: just by me making that very

characterization reveals a personal bias for or against what I believed at the time rather than what

the facts were that I presented). Whether I did or did not agree with their decisions, the direction

of their decisions did not enter into my, or my organization’s assessments.

My job was to present an intelligence assessment, of which I presented hundreds, if not

thousands, during my career. Sometimes, the decision-maker did not agree with it – for whatever

reason he or she had. I was owed no explanation for their disagreement or their decision (note,

the good ones usually did offer one). The point is: a decision was made, and we moved forward.

Had I harbored angst or ill feelings against those decisions, then I automatically would have been

allowing my personal bias and opinion to negatively affect my analysis. I would also have been

negligent in my duties to continue analyzing and see what an adversary reaction to our actions

might be based on that new decision.

WE HAVE STANDARDS:

As a professor teaching tomorrow’s young intelligence professionals in the processes and

methodologies of analysis, I spend a great deal of time lecturing on the scourge of bias and

politicization ruining our analysis. I press the students on the fact that we must push through our

own opinions and biases (which we honestly have and of which we must be aware) to present

“just the facts”, as Sgt Joe Friday would say on Dragnet.

You may be asking if there is guidance for our IC? Yes. Standards of IC analytic conduct are

spelled out in Intelligence Community Directive – 203 (ICD-203). Over my career, I spent a

great deal of time ensuring our analytic products at every organization in which I served met

those standards. These are so vital to analytic integrity, that I spend a great deal of time teaching

our students at Coastal Carolina University about ICD 203, and how those standards serve as the

basis for how to conduct and present our intelligence analysis. ICD 203 spells out five Analytic

standards and nine Tradecraft standards. The top two analytic standards are “be objective” and

be “free of political considerations.” It does not get much clearer than that in priority or words

as to how we are supposed to approach our analytical processes and assessments.

Simply based on the standards set forth in ICD-203, the tone and tenor expressed by the authors

and their IC “sources” in the above-mentioned articles illustrates the IC is already violating the

ICD’s guidance. With that, non-objectivity and political positioning can easily become, and

already have, the basis of how those analysts and their leadership approach their assessments –

rather than the facts of the issues. To be consistent and to develop trust in our abilities, we cannot

have this in our intelligence community.

If I may digress, perhaps I could offer the media a suggestion – develop your own (ICD-203-

like) standards of conduct in your trade. While it may be a challenge to dig for facts and keep

your opinions out of “reporting.” Your readers and audiences would be better served.

ACCOUTABILITY:

Again, let me be direct and blunt. As leaders, we must hold ourselves accountable for our

decisions and lead by example. That is why over four years ago, I called for the 51 former

intelligence officials who signed the infamous “Hunter Biden Laptop” letter to be stricken of

their clearances because, well, they violated all the principals we must stand for in intelligence

AND they violated ICD-203. Specifically, by my grading, they violated 4 of 5 Analytic

Standards and 8 of 9 Tradecraft standards. Had I had my junior, mid-level or senior analysts do

that under my watch, I would have counseled them for their shortcomings, or relieved them of

their duties if the trend continued. Why can we not do that to these so-called former intelligence

leaders? They make extreme amounts of money based on those clearances and their ability to

“speak as an expert” with the media, yet they violate the very standards to which they were

sworn to uphold. Without any accountability to our leaders, what example are we setting for our

younger core professionals? We are tacitly approving this mis-guided behavior in our workforce

by not penalizing those who violate it.

A Congressionally requested OMBUDSMAN investigation released in Jan 2021 revealed

politicization had occurred in the first Trump Administration. The investigation determined that

there were violations of the ICD-203 standards, up and down the intelligence system. The report

found that some people who didn’t agree with the president’s policy views and objectives

decided among themselves not to provide a full intelligence picture, while others tried to tailor

what they showed the president to match his existing plans.

That was great to report on it. However, it’s been four years. What accountability was levied

because of that report? What additional training was provided to the analysts and managers

guilty of those violations? The articles referenced at the beginning of this post make me wonder

if any accountability was levied or understanding made.

REORGANIZATION?:

Another concern expressed in the above articles was that Trump could reorganize or alter the IC.

Again, I say, so what? It is his prerogative. I do personally believe we need to look at the

intelligence community, and to hold the IC to a higher standard. Congress enacted the

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, which was supposed to

overcome the IC shortcomings that led to the intelligence failure of 9/11/2001. However, IRTPA

never reached its full potential. IRTPA needs a “refresh” as complacency has set in in IC across

several agencies. I am not calling for a major overhaul, but some work around the margins of

IRTPA should be looked at by Congress – in its oversight role – and also by the new

administration. We can be more efficient, promote better analytical standards, and especially

can promote and ensure better cooperation across the IC. This oversight effort needs to be done

quickly, efficiently and in a non-partisan manner.

CONCLUSION:

I must point out that I am not saying intelligence professionals cannot have opinions, political

ideologies, or judgment on policy decisions. As Americans, we can, do and should have ideas

and opinions – preferably well-informed and well-thought-out ones. However, as I told my

analysts in every organization and at every position, those opinions, policy positions, and

political ideologies have no place in our analysis and must stay outside the “SCIF” doors when

we go to do our nation’s intelligence work.

Mark S. Chandler

CASIL, President and CEO